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Abstract
Using a sample of 356 U.S. non-financial firms from 2002 to 2011, we derive endoge-
nous systematic credit risk and Credit Default Swap (CDS) illiquidity factors, and show
that they dominate firm-specific and exogenous market factors as determinants of indi-
vidual firms’ CDS spreads. Our model performs well for cross-sectional predictions and
can be used for estimating CDS spreads for firms that do not have traded CDSs. Our
findings question Basel III’s adoption of CDS-implied probability for counterparty risk
management, as CDS spread is not a pure individual firm default risk measure devoid of
market credit and illiquidity premia.
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1 Introduction
Basel III stipulates that Credit Default Swap (CDS) implied default probability must be used in
the calculation of risk capital attributed to counterparty credit risk.1 CDS is a credit derivative
that offers protection against bond default. However, not every counterparty has issued bonds
that are publicly tradable. It is even a smaller subset of firms that have CDS contracts written
on their bonds. Thus, financial institutions need to be able to estimate the CDS spreads for
firms that do not have (actively traded) CDS contracts.
At the same time, previous research has suggested that CDS spreads may not be solely
driven by individual firm default risk. For example, Tang and Yan (2007) and Corò, Dufour,
and Varotto (2013) show that CDS spreads are affected by liquidity risk, and Doshi, Ericsson,
Jacobs, and Turnbull (2013) show that bond market conditions affect CDS spreads, too. Thus,
it is not implausible that a CDS spread is not a “pure” measure of credit risk.
In this paper, we explore another set of CDS drivers, namely, the endogenous systematic risk
factors, derived from traded CDSs. We set out to answer a question to which extent one-year
CDS spreads are driven by those systematic factors, and what is the role of other known types
of factors in explaining the cross-sectional variations of CDS spreads.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we develop a comprehensive empirical
model of CDS changes. The model includes firm-specific and systematic factors addressing both
credit and liquidity risks. Then, using a sample of 356 U.S. publicly listed non-financial firms,
we show that individual credit risk measures can capture only up to 18% of the variation of
changes in CDS spreads, which is comparable to the 16% captured by individual low frequency
CDS liquidity measure. In contrast, the exogenous market factors (related to bond and equity
markets) capture 30% of the variation.
We further derive three endogenous systematic CDS credit factors and two systematic CDS
illiquidity factors. The systematic credit risk factors are constructed as rating-based (using the
Nelson-Siegel (1984) model) and industry- and market-wide factors (using Leland-Toft (1996)
1[“When computing CVA (Credit Valuation Adjustment) risk capital charge,] s is the credit spread of the
counterparty [...]. Whenever the CDS spread of the counterparty is available, this must be used. Whenever
such a CDS spread is not available, the bank must use a proxy spread that is appropriate based on the rating,
industry and region of the counterparty.” Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and
banking systems, p.32, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
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model). The liquidity factors are derived from the Leland-Toft (1996) model, too. We show
that these endogenous systematic factors outperform all other sets of factors and capture 44% of
variation in changes in CDS spreads. In the presence of these factors, the explanatory power of
other factors is substantially weakened. Moreover, after the financial crisis of 2007, systematic
CDS market illiquidity has a prominent effect on CDS spreads.
Finally, we show that our model has good cross-sectional predictive power. The out-of-
sample R-square is 43%, compared to a historical average. Our model is well suited to approx-
imate CDS spreads for firms with no (actively) traded CDSs. At the same time, our results
suggest a relatively minor role of individual firm credit risk in determining CDS spreads, as
compared to systematic factors.
2 Related Literature
Our study is grounded in two strands of literature: the first one suggests the importance of the
systematic factors and peer CDS spreads for determining individual spreads; the second one
highlights the role of the liquidity risk.
Doshi, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Turnbull (2013) find that market variables including 6-month
Treasury yield and the difference between the 10-year and 6-month yields explain cross-sectional
CDS variation. Conrad, Dittmar, and Hameed (2011) find changes in the CDS spreads of the
systematically important financial institutions lead changes in the CDS spreads of other firms.
Galil, Shapir, Amiram, and Ben-Zion (2014) find the median CDS spreads of mixed credit
quality have a cross-sectional explanatory power for individual CDS spreads. For sovereign
CDS, Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) find global factors are more important
than individual country factors in explaining CDS spread changes.
Tang and Yan (2007) and Corò, Dufour, and Varotto (2013) explore the relation between
CDS spreads and their liquidity. Tang and Yan (2007) investigate several liquidity measures
based on CDS trades such as trade-to-quote ratio and bid-ask spread, and document a positive
effect of illiqudiuty on CDS spreads. Corò, Dufour, and Varotto (2013) propose a liquidity
measure based on the bid-ask spreads of the intra-day trades in CDSs. They find that, among
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the CDS spreads of the 135 European entities, the CDS liquidity risk dominates the credit risk.
The prevailing studies construct CDS liquidity measures relying on daily bid-ask spread or
intra-day trading data. However, using such measures in not always possible, as many CDS data
vendors report composite CDS prices.2 Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) find, however,
that low-frequency liquidity measures can capture the high-frequency liquidity effect in the
stock market. Following this finding, we use the the low-frequency liquidity measure for the
changes in CDS spreads in this paper.
Early studies such as Gennotte and Leland (1990) have modeled the effects of illiquidity
in equilibrium asset pricing model. Cespa and Foucault (2014) extend the model of Gennotte
and Leland (1990) and argue that illiquidity interacts between assets in the same or different
markets, affecting the equilibrium asset prices, through cross-market learning of traders. Such
“cross-learning” forms a feedback loop between assets according to the level of price informa-
tiveness and could lead to illiquidity spillover across markets. Supporting this idea, Das and
Hanouna (2009) and Huang, Huang, and Oxman (2015) find the linkage between equity and
CDS markets. Das and Hanouna (2009) find stock illiquidity can explain the changes in the
individual CDS spreads; they argue that traders revert to equity markets to hedge their ex-
posure to credit risk. Similarly, Huang, Huang, and Oxman (2015) find that stock illiquidity
increases credit risk premium.
Motivated by the previous research, in this paper we construct a comprehensive list of factors,
capturing both firm specific and systematic credit and illiduity risk, and control for possible
cross-market spillovers.
3 Research Design
In order to investigate in detail the drives of CDS spreads, we estimate a panel regression of the
quarterly changes of logarithmic CDS spreads (∆ logCDSit) of firm i computed at month t on
2Our Markit database contains CDS spreads expressed as composite prices, where no bid and ask information
is provided. Other CDS databases, such as Reuters EOD, and Credit Market Analysis (CMA), also provide
composite prices for CDS, and CDS bid-ask spreads are not available in these databases either. See Mayordomo,
Peña, and Schwartz (2014) for a comprehensive comparison of those databases.
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a set of firm specific characteristics (FirmSpecificit) and systematic factors (Systematicit).
∆ logCDSit = β0 + β1 ∆FirmSpecificit + β2 ∆Systematicit + εit (1)
In each set of factors, we distinguish between credit- and liquidity-risk related factors. The
following subsections discuss each of the factors in detail.
3.1 Firm-specific Factors
3.1.1 Firm-specific credit-risk factors
We use several accounting- and market-based measures to capture the ability of a firm to pay
its short- and long-term debt.
(1) Cash Ratio (CR) determines the firm’s ability to pay its debt due immediately. We
expect a negative relation between firm’s cash ratio and its CDS spread. Individual firms’ cash
ratios are calculated as:
CRit =
Cashit + Short-term Investmentit
Current Liabilitiesit
. (2)
(2) Profitability (Profit) is related to the overall health of the firm and, thus, its ability
to meet the long-term obligations. It is expected to be negatively related to the firm’s CDS
spread. We calculate firm’s profitability as:
Profitit =
Retain Earningsit
Total Assetsit
. (3)
(3) Size (TA) is another indicator for a probability of a firm’s default. Larger firms are less
likely to default, as they usually have more capital, better collateral, and larger loss buffers.
We expect a negative relation between firm size and its CDS spread. The firm’s total asset as
filed to annual reports is used as a measure of size.
(4) Firm Leverage (Lev) is expected to be positively related to default risk and, thus, its
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CDS spread. A higher leverage indicates that the firm relies more heavily on borrowing to
fiance its activities. In this paper, we calculate firm’s accounting leverage as:
Levit =
Total Liabilitiesit
Total Equityit
. (4)
(5) Historical Volatility (HVol) is expected to be positively related to a firm’s CDS spread.
Doshi, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Turnbull (2013), e.g., show that historical volatility of the under-
lying stock predicts changes in CDS spreads. We estimate the historical volatility of daily stock
returns over one month prior to the date of interest.
(6) Merton (1974) Distance to Default (DTD) reflects the required change in the firm’s asset
value, expressed as the number of its standard deviations, in order to trigger default.3 It is
expected to be negatively related to firm’s CDS spread. We use the iterative method as in
Vassalou and Xing (2004) to estimate a one year DTD using the past 12 months of daily stock
prices as:
DTD =
log(V/D) + (µV − σ2V /2)T ]
σV
√
T
(5)
where V is the firm’s asset value, T is time to maturity and D is the face value of the outstanding
debt, µV is instantaneous mean and σV is instantaneous volatility of the return on the asset
process.
3.1.2 Firm-specific liquidity factors
Recent studies including Tang and Yan (2007), Das and Hanouna (2009), and Corò, Dufour,
and Varotto (2013) find that CDS illiquidity risk is priced in CDS spreads. We consider several
firm-specific illiquidity measures as suggested by Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) to
address potentially different effects of various types of illiquidty measures.4
3Despite the proliferation of measures for credit quality, e.g., Moody’s credit rating, Altman Z-score, physical
PDs estimated from a reduced-form model such that in Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012) etc., DTD remains one
of the most widely used measures, see, for example, Bharath and Shumway (2008).
4Another measure of illiquidity of individual CDS spread is its bid-ask spread (see Tang and Yan (2007) and
Corò, Dufour, and Varotto (2013)). CDS bid-ask spread information, however, is not available in our sample,
since the CDS spread is expressed as a composite price.
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(1) Number of Contributors to CDS quotes (Contr) proxies for CDS trading volume (Bon-
gaerts, Jong, and Driessen (2011)).5 Trading volume is a useful indicator of the level of market
liquidity. Higher trading volume implies more liquid markets. We, thus, expect, Contr to be
negatively related to the CDS spread.
(2) High-minus-Low (HL) is the difference between highest and lowest quotes of CDS spread
taken over one month. It is a proxy of a CDS bid-ask spread, and it is expected to be positively
related to the spread itself.
(3) Roll (1984) measure (Roll) is the effective bid-ask spread for an asset, measured as two
square roots of the negative of the serial covariance of the asset’s price changes. Following Roll
(1984), we calculate the individual CDS Roll measure over one month as:
Rollit =

2
√
−cov(∆CDSt,∆CDSt−1) if cov(∆CDSt,∆CDSt−1) < 0,
0 otherwise
(6)
where ∆ is the operator of daily change and CDS is the corresponding CDS spread.
(4) Days of Zero Returns (Zeros) is another proxy for illiquidity proposed in Lesmond,
Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). The more zero returns a security exhibits, the less liquid it is.
We expect Zeros to be positively related to the CDS spread, and compute this measure over a
one months as:
Zerosit =
# days with zero returnit
T
(7)
where T is the number of trading days in the month of interest.
(5) Amihud (2002) measure is one of the most widely used measures for illiquidity. We
consider two versions of it: the one based on the daily CDS spreads (AmihudCDS) and the one
based on the stock (AmihudStock), as Das and Hanouna (2009) find that stock illiquidity also
affects the CDS spread. We expect both these measures to be positively related to CDS spread.
5Since CDS spreads in the Markit database are composite prices, no information on the CDS trading volume
is available.
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We follow Bongaerts, Jong, and Driessen (2011) and compute AmihudCDS as:
AmihudCDS = 1/N
∑( |rCt |
Contr
)
(8)
where rC is the daily return of the CDS spread, Contr is the number of contributors to the
CDS quotes, proxying for a trading volume, and N is the number of trading days in the past
year.
AmihudStock is computed as suggested by Das and Hanouna (2009):
AmihudStock = 1/T
∑( |rSt |
Pt × Vt
× 106
)
(9)
where rS is the daily stock return, P is the daily closing price, V is the daily trading volume,
and T is the number of trading days in the previous five months.
3.2 Systematic Factors
Recent studies such as Diaz, Groba, and Serrano (2013) and Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and
Singleton (2011) find that global or systematic factors do impact CDS spreads. We extend
these studies and investigate a wide range of systematic factors, exogenous and endogenous
to the CDS market, distinguishing, as in the case of firm specific factors, between credit and
liquidity risk factors.
3.2.1 Exogenous Systematic Factors
(1) Bond market factors are expected to affect CDS spreads as bond and CDS markets co-move
(Doshi, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Turnbull 2013). We use several systematic bond market factors:
the U.S. 6-month Treasury yield (US6mY ield) to proxi for the level of the yield curve, the
difference between 10-year and 6-month yields (Slope) as proxy for its slope, and the difference
between Moody’s Baa and Aaa yields (BaaMinusAaa) as a proxy for the market credit risk
premium. In addition, we include a cross-sectional average recovery rate (Recovery) as a
systematic factor, since the recovery rate is highly related to market conditions (Tang and Yan
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2013).
(2) Equity market factors can also affect CDS spreads either directly though cross-market
hedging or indirectly by proving information on general investor sentiment. We use CBOE VIX
index (V IX) as a proxy for the level of uncertainty in equity markets.
3.2.2 Endogenous Systematic Factors
In addition to the exogenous factors described above, we construct systematic factors, which
are endogenous to the CDS market. We use two different models: a semi-parametric and a
fully parametric structural model to derive endogenous CDS credit and liquidity factors.
(1) Semi-parametric model of Nelson and Siegel (1987) allows us to separate pure credit risk
factor embedded in CDS spreads for each rating class of underlying bonds (Hu, Pan, and Wang
2013). For each rating, we construct the rating-based credit curves from the daily CDS spreads.
The obtained fitted values of the CDS spread (y) are constant within the same rating category
of the underlying, and can be used as a rating based systematic credit-risk factor. The absolute
deviations of the individual CDS spreads from the fitted values (e) account for individual CDS
liquidity as well as possible model errors. The details of the Nelson-Siegel decomposition are
reported in Appendix A.
(2) Structural model of Leland and Toft (1996) allows us to decompose individual CDS
spreads into their credit and liquidity components. Each logarithmic CDS spread is assumed
to be a sum of its log credit component (λ) and the liquidity component (θ):
logCDS = log λ+ log θ (10)
The logarithmic representation makes sure that both credit and liquidity components take
only positive values. We follow the methodology of Forte (2011) and calibrate λit and θit for each
individual CDS spread at the end of each quarter. The technical details of the decomposition
are described in Appendix B. We then construct the systematic credit and liquidity factors by
averaging the respective individual λ-s and θ-s. We consider two types of systematic factors:
the market- and industry-wide factors:
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log λINDit ≡
1
Nk − 1
∑
j 6=i,j∈k,
log λjt, and log θ
IND
it ≡
1
Nk − 1
∑
j 6=i,j∈k,
log θjt
log λMKTit ≡
1
N −Nk
∑
j 6=i,j 6∈k
log λjt, and log θ
MKT
it ≡
1
N −Nk
∑
j 6=i,j 6∈k
log θjt (11)
Nk and N are, respectively, the number of firms in industry k and the total number of firms
at the and of a quarter t. We exclude the referenced firm i, or the referenced industry k, when
computing the industry or market factors, in order to avoid spurious regression results.
We perform further tests in Appendix C of the endogenous systematic factors from above.
We show that the systematic factors λMKT and θMKT indeed capture the credit and liquidity
information in the CDS spreads respectively.
4 Data
We obtain daily CDS spreads from the Markit database. The Markit database provides daily
information of CDS for maturities from 6 months to 30 years. As of 2011, our Markit database
provides global, corporate, municipal, and sovereign single-name CDS data of approximately
2,650 individual entities and 3,000 entity-tiers. Our main sample covers 356 U.S. non-financial
firms from January 2001 to May 2012. It contains the average of daily CDS spreads reported
by different contributors, underlying debt seniority and the associated recovery rates. We drop
the year 2001 in our sample, as our Markit database covers fewer than 100 companies in that
year. The year 2012 was dropped as well because the data was incomplete for that year.
CDS spreads for the same firm may have different quoted prices due to the contract tier,
which is related to the payback priority of the underlying bond. For example, secured debt has
a higher priority in the payback order than subordinate debt. In our sample, there are, in total,
2.7 million individual CDS quotes. Most of these are for Senior Unsecured Debt (SNRFOR),
which accounts for 75% of all data points. Subordinated Debt (SUBLT) accounts for another
20% while Junior Subordinated Debt (JRSUBUT2) and Preference Shares (PREFT1) account
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Table 1: CDS Spreads Descriptive Statistics
The table reports the descriptive statistics of daily CDS spreads (in basis points)
with maturities from 6 months to 10 years in our sample of 356 non-financial firms
from January 2002 to December 2011. It contains means, medians, standard de-
viations (Std), and maximum and minimum values. “Missing Rate (%)” indicates
the percentage of missing data points. The last row reports the total number of
observations for a given maturity. “R. Rate” stands for reported recovery rate.
CDS spread (bp) R. Rate
6m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 7y 10y (in %)
Mean 151.27 171.68 184.29 205.00 220.70 236.19 234.96 237.62 40.05
Median 29.57 40.97 55.06 73.37 88.35 105.18 108.23 117.00 40.00
Std 728.38 672.18 603.90 573.07 547.42 510.59 507.98 489.60 6.20
Max 48,355.65 40,175.46 29,701.04 33,899.01 21,782.97 25,340.71 24,222.70 23,791.63 80.75
Min 0.58 0.81 0.79 1.28 1.45 1.00 3.27 4.34 1.25
Missing Rate (%) 42.96 21.63 23.19 16.71 43.25 9.64 18.36 20.20 1.35
# of Obs 510,428 701,372 687,346 745,410 507,910 808,637 730,570 714,181 882,804
for only 0.02% and less than 0.01%, respectively.6 We use CDS quotes for senior unsecured
debt. If this senior tier is not available for a given firm, the subordinated debt is chosen instead.
The descriptive statistics of our initial sample are reported in Table 1.
The 10-year CDS spreads have the highest mean of 237.62 basis points (bp), while 6-month
CDS spreads have the lowest mean of 151.27 bp. The average recovery rate is 40% across all
maturities. Being particularly interested in the impact of liquidity risk, we choose to use 1-year
CDS contracts in this paper instead of the more liquid 5-year CDS. 21% of the observations
for the 1-year contracts are missing in the database. For the 1-year CDS contracts, the mean
spread is 171.68 bp, and its standard deviation is 672.18 bp. The maximum spread is 40,175.46
bp while the minimum spread is 0.81 bp.7
We collect firm’s market information from CRSP database, firm’s accounting information
from COMPUSTAT, and U.S. Treasury yields from the Federal Reserve, H15 report. Table 2
reports the descriptive statistics of our dependent and explanatory variables.
6On the 1st of August 2010, the Markit database changed the way how the composite CDS spreads are
constructed. We control for this potential structural break when estimating the regressions.
7The maximum spread was reached just before Smurfit-Stone Container defaulted. The company was one of
the largest forest, paper, and packaging companies in the world. Its CDS spread peaked on January 22, 2009,
and the company filed for bankruptcy on January 27, 2009. The extraordinary large maximum spread is due
to the procedure used to annualize CDS spreads.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables
The table reports the descriptive statistics of quarterly changes (∆) in log CDS
spread and other explanatory variables from 2002 to 2011. CR is firm’s cash ratio;
Profit is firm’s accounting profitability; TA is firm’s total book value of asset; DTD is
Merton’s distance to default; HVol is the historical volatility of the underlying stock;
Lev is firm’s leverage ratio; Contr is the number of contributors to CDS quotes; HL
is the highest minus lowest CDS spread in a month; Roll is the Roll (1984) measure;
Zeros is the share of days with zero returns in a month; AmihudCDS is the Amihud
(2002) measure of the CDS spreads; AmihudStock is the Amihud (2002) measure of
the underlying stock; Recovery is the CDS recovery rate; US6mYield is the U.S.
6-month Treasury yield; Slope is the difference between 10-year and 6-month yields;
BaaMinusAaa is the difference between Baa and Aaa yields; VIX is the CBOE VIX
index; y and |e| are the components from Nelson-Siegel model; and θ and λ are the
components from Leland-Toft model. The total number of observations (# of Obs)
for all variables is 12,545.
Mean Std Max Min
∆ log CDS .015 .538 2.668 -2.122
∆ CR .002 .256 5.470 -5.748
∆ Profit -.001 .140 3.334 -6.391
∆ TA ($000) 230 2210 52653 -59661
∆ DTD -.039 1.661 19.160 -9.565
∆ log HVol .004 .153 1.042 -1.106
∆ log Lev .001 .153 2.010 -1.596
∆ Contr -.034 2.857 19.000 -21.000
∆ HL (×100) .022 .972 31.068 -45.603
∆ Roll (× 100) .003 .243 9.615 -1.619
∆ Zeros -.012 .158 1.000 -1.000
∆ logAchimudCDS (× 100) .001 .249 3.705 -1.904
∆ logAchimudStock -.017 .306 2.226 -3.090
∆ Recovery (%) -.024 1.362 22.500 -21.286
∆ US6mYield -.085 .501 .680 -1.830
∆ Slope .014 .486 1.240 -.960
∆ BaaMinusAaa .010 .412 1.910 -1.340
∆ VIX .251 8.601 36.950 -19.560
∆ log y .018 .421 1.584 -1.072
∆ log |e| .018 1.129 8.731 -8.093
∆ log θIND -.011 .245 .815 -1.644
∆ log λIND .033 .358 1.366 -1.857
∆ log θMKT -.011 .218 .558 -.575
∆ log λMKT .032 .316 .689 -.690
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients for all variables. The correlations between ∆ logCDS
and all the factors generally exhibit the expected signs.
The three individual accounting-based credit risk factors are negatively correlated with the
change in the CDS spread, but the correlation coefficients are rather low. The correlation
with cash ratio (∆CR) is -0.030, profitability (∆Profit) -0.012, and total assets (∆TA) -0.003,
suggesting that these variables may not be able to timely capture the changes in the CDS spread.
The only accounting based variable that has a sizable correlation with the CDS spread is the
leverage (∆Lev), with the positive correlation coefficient of of 0.332. The relations between
∆ logCDS and the market-based risk variables are stronger. Distance to default (∆DTD)
exhibits a negative correlation of -0.374, and historical volatility (∆ logHV ol) of 0.346.
Changes in all CDS illiquidity measures are positively related to the changes in CDS spreads
with the exception of ∆Zeros, which has a negative but insignificant correlation coefficient.
∆HL has the highest correlation coefficient of 0.220. Interestingly, stock illiquidity is also
strongly related to CDS spreads with the correlation coefficient between ∆ logAmihudStock and
∆ logCDS of 0.351.
∆ logCDS exhibits high correlation with the exogenous systematic factors related to both
bond and equity markets. The largest correlation coefficients in absolute values are with market
volatility (∆V IX) of 0.398, the short-term rate (∆US6mY ield) of -0.410, and the credit spread
(∆BaaMinusAaa) of 0.453. Similarly, we observe high correlation with endogenous systematic
factors. The highest correlation of 0.608 is between ∆ logCDS and the rating-based market
CDS factor ∆ log y, followed by the market- and industry-wide systematic credit risk factors
log λMKT and log λIND exhibiting correlations of 0.457 and 0.431 respectively. The systematic
liquidity factors log θMKT and log θIND are also highly correlated with CDS spreads, with
correlation coefficients exceeding 30%.
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Table 3: Factors correlation matrix
The table reports the correlation coefficients for the changes in the log CDS spread and other explanatory variables from 2002 to
2011. ∆ denotes quarterly changes. CR is firm’s cash ratio; Profit is firm’s accounting profitability; TA is firm’s total book value
of asset; DTD is Merton’s distance to default; HVol is the historical volatility of the underlying stock; Lev is firm’s leverage ratio;
Contr is the number of contributors to CDS quotes; HL is the highest minus lowest CDS spread in a month; Roll is the Roll (1984)
measure; Zeros is the days of zero returns; AmihudCDS is the Amihud (2002) measure of the CDS spreads; AchimudStock is the
Amihud (2002) measure of the underlying stock; Recovery is the CDS recovery rate; US6mYield is the U.S. 6-month Treasury yield;
Slope is the difference between 10-year and 6-month yields; BaaMinusAaa is the difference between Baa and Aaa yields; VIX is
the CBOE VIX index; y and |e| are the components from Nelson-Siegel model; and θ and λ are the components from Leland-Toft
model.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) ∆ logCDS -.030 -.012 -.003 -.374 .346 .332 .044 .220 .091 -.012 .017 .351 -.052 -.410 .092 .453 .398 .608 .135 .304 .431 .330 .457
(2) ∆ CR .090 .006 .053 -.014 -.021 -.003 -.003 -.002 .014 .026 -.039 .003 .026 .009 -.023 -.020 -.052 -.022 -.018 -.020 -.018 -.027
(3) ∆ Profit -.034 .019 -.004 .000 .003 -.018 -.009 -.031 .006 -.045 .008 .029 -.006 .001 .014 -.020 -.010 -.012 .008 -.016 .001
(4) ∆ TA -.038 -.030 .176 -.013 -.008 -.004 .011 .019 -.056 .010 .038 -.005 -.022 .001 -.017 -.026 -.045 .016 -.035 .012
(5) ∆ DTD -.675 -.567 -.007 -.107 -.046 -.008 .021 -.403 .002 .280 .005 -.381 -.359 -.484 -.191 -.387 -.166 -.411 -.188
(6) ∆ HVol .289 -.013 .146 .068 .028 -.023 .497 -.014 -.372 .101 .412 .268 .460 .193 .571 .010 .630 .014
(7) ∆ Lev .005 .129 .050 .000 .029 .355 -.021 -.243 .012 .338 .340 .375 .156 .260 .176 .253 .208
(8) ∆ Contr .000 -.011 -.064 -.017 -.003 .005 .007 -.017 -.001 -.007 .024 -.006 -.040 .058 -.038 .066
(9) ∆ HL .579 -.014 .064 .167 -.189 -.104 .032 .226 .202 .154 .095 .087 .089 .109 .100
(10) ∆ Roll -.017 .081 .076 -.089 -.048 .023 .103 .085 .068 .051 .044 .035 .058 .035
(11) ∆ Zeros -.016 .045 .012 -.027 .014 .048 .003 .011 .019 .047 -.005 .050 -.009
(12) ∆ logAmihudCDS .007 -.005 -.076 .007 .011 .026 .003 .000 -.013 .026 -.026 .029
(13) ∆ logAchimudStock -.049 -.369 -.061 .477 .249 .475 .206 .378 .169 .405 .206
(14) ∆ Recovery .030 -.006 -.027 -.009 -.026 -.010 -.034 .009 -.036 .004
(15) ∆ US6mYield -.560 -.345 -.186 -.541 -.225 -.477 -.212 -.535 -.258
(16) ∆ Slope -.026 -.077 .085 .030 .322 -.113 .360 -.120
(17) ∆ BaaMinusAaa .647 .648 .276 .327 .410 .357 .484
(18) ∆ VIX .610 .266 .170 .443 .197 .509
(19) ∆ log y .436 .440 .527 .493 .617
(20) ∆ log |e| .186 .195 .212 .250
(21) ∆ log θIND -.246 .821 -.160
(22) ∆ log λIND -.178 .820
(23) ∆ log θMKT -.203
(24) ∆ log λMKT
14
5.2 Multivariate Analysis
The estimation results for our panel regressions for changes in log CDS spreads are reported
in Table 4. We, first, run individual regressions in which we include only one type of factors:
individual credit risk factors (Model 1), individual liquidity risk factors (Models 2 and 3),
systematic exogenous factors (Model 4), and systematic endogenous factors (Model 5). We,
then, estimate the full specification including all the factors (Model 6). The results suggest that
each set of factors contributes to explaining the variation of CDS spreads, and a comprehensive
model should reflect all four sets of risks. Individual CDS liquidity, e.g., is as important as
individual credit risk, as reflected in similar explanatory power of Models 1, 2 and 3. At the
same time, the endogenous systematic factors have by far the highest explanatory power as
compared to other factors. The adjusted R-square of the complete model (Model 6) of 46.8% is
only 2.8 percentage points higher that that of the model based on endogenous systematic factors
(Model 5) and 28.3 percentage points higher than that of the individual-credit-risk factor based
model (Model 1). Below we discuss the estimation results of the individual models in detail.
Taking alone individual accounting- and market-based credit factors explain up to 18.5%
of the variation in CDS spread changes (Model 1). The strongest effect is associated with the
∆ logLev, ∆ logHV ol, and ∆DTD. The corresponding loadings of 0.755, 0.727, and -0.037 are
highly significant. The magnitude of these coefficients decreases substantially to 0.274, 0.120,
and -0.010, respectively, when the full specification (Model 6) is considered. The corresponding
t-statistics ranging from 8.8 to 21.3 in absolute values in Model 1 drop to a range of 2.8 to 9.0
in Model 6, again reflecting the dominant role of the systematic factors.
Individual CDS liquidity factors (Models 2 and 3) capture up to 15.4% and 16.1% of the
variation of the changes in CDS spreads.8 These adjusted R-squares are comparable with
the one in Model 1, indicating that individual CDS liquidity factors capture approximately as
much variation in CDS spreads as credit risk factors. Almost all of the liquidity variables are
significant at 1% level, except for ∆AmihudCDS, which gains significance only after 2010. The
signs of the loadings on liquidity factors largely corroborate the intuition that CDS spreads
are more likely to increase when CDSs turn less liquid, which is also supported by findings in
8Compared to Model 2, in Model 3 we also control for the effect of the change in the reporting style of the
Markit database on the August 1, 2010.
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Table 4: Panel regression results for quarterly changes in log CDS spread
The table reports the panel regressions results for the quarterly changes in log CDS spreads
from 2002 to 2011. The explanatory variables are described in Sections 3. D is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 after August 2010 to control for the reporting changes of the
Markit database. ***, **, and * stand for the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.011** 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.022*** -0.004 -0.009**
[2.574] [4.875] [5.253] [-5.317] [-1.112] [-2.547]
∆ CR -0.032* -0.003
[-1.876] [-0.204]
∆ Profit -0.034 -0.011
[-1.088] [-0.430]
∆ TA -0.000*** -0.000
[-4.677] [-1.125]
∆ DTD -0.037*** -0.010***
[-8.797] [-2.828]
∆ log HVol 0.727*** 0.120***
[18.639] [3.068]
∆ log Lev 0.755*** 0.274***
[21.346] [8.977]
∆ Contr 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.003**
[5.235] [3.322] [2.359]
∆ HL 10.559*** 10.030*** 7.011***
[18.718] [17.510] [15.075]
∆ Roll -9.776*** -9.838*** -6.588***
[-4.377] [-4.289] [-3.603]
∆ Zeros -0.076*** -0.086*** -0.070***
[-2.723] [-3.050] [-3.103]
∆ logAmihudCDS 1.307 -2.461 -0.082
[0.734] [-1.225] [-0.050]
∆ logAmihudStock 0.569*** 0.563*** 0.019
[38.833] [38.547] [1.224]
∆ Contr × D 0.052*** 0.018***
[7.117] [2.954]
∆ HL × D 15.014*** 9.884***
[5.169] [4.238]
∆ Roll × D -2.780 -0.776
[-0.297] [-0.104]
∆ Zeros × D 0.167 -0.119
[1.027] [-0.914]
∆ logAmihudCDS× D 11.202*** -0.897
[2.581] [-0.257]
∆ Recovery -3.402*** -4.124***
[-3.268] [-4.412]
∆ US6mYield -0.373*** -0.040***
[-34.889] [-3.444]
∆ Slope -0.091*** 0.011
[-8.803] [1.086]
∆ BaaMinusAaa 0.264*** -0.014
[19.307] [-1.070]
∆ VIX 0.012*** -0.001**
[19.890] [-2.019]
∆ log y 0.348*** 0.300***
[18.161] [15.081]
∆ log |e| -0.069*** -0.070***
[-19.517] [-20.104]
∆ log θIND 0.295*** 0.237***
[10.736] [8.661]
∆ log λIND 0.305*** 0.286***
[16.262] [15.575]
∆ log θMKT 0.484*** 0.356***
[13.600] [9.263]
∆ log λMKT 0.375*** 0.348***
[14.392] [13.025]
Adj R-sqr 0.185 0.154 0.161 0.306 0.440 0.468
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Corò, Dufour, and Varotto (2013). For example, higher HL implies larger bid-ask spread, thus,
lower liquidity. Consistently, the loading on ∆HL is 10.559, significant at the 1% level. High
and significant loading on the CDS Amihud after August 2010 also supports a positive relation
between CDS illiquidity and its spread. Surprisingly, we find negative coefficient on ∆Roll.
This result can be driven by relatively high correlation between ∆HL and ∆Roll (57.90%),
as both these variables proxy for CDS bid-ask spread. Contr and Zeros reflect the depth
the CDS market. The coefficients on ∆Contr and ∆Zeros are 0.008 and -0.076, respectively.
An increase of Contr or a decrease of Zeros indicates higher trading activity in the CDS
market. The estimated signs imply that the activity increase is driven by higher demand for
protection by CDS buyers, thus, leading to higher CDS spreads. Consistent with Das and
Hanouna (2009), we find a positive loadings on ∆ logAmihudStock (0.569) significantly at the
1% level. CDS spreads tend to increase when the related stock becomes less liquid, which can
be attributed to cross-market hedging by CDS sellers. When individual liquidity factors are
considered within the full specification (Model 6), the magnitude of the estimated coefficients
decreases similar to the individual credit-risk factors. Importantly, individual equity liquidity
∆ logAmihudStock turns from highly significant to insignificant (the t-statistics drops from 38.2
to 1.2), indicating that its effect on CDS spreads is completely surpassed by systematic factors.
The same holds for ∆ logAmihudCDS.
The adjusted R-square increases substantially to 30.6% if only the exogenous systematic
factors are used instead of individual factors (Model 4). Negative and highly significant coef-
ficients on ∆US6mY ield and ∆Slope imply that higher level and larger slope of the Treasury
yield curve, associated with better economic conditions, predict lower CDS spreads. Whereas
higher credit risk premium (∆BaaMinusAaa) and higher uncertainty (∆V IX) lead to increase
in CDS spreads. The corresponding loadings of 0.264 and 0.012, respectively, are highly sig-
nificant. These factors, however, lose their statistical support when considered within the full
specification (Model 6). The factor that remains significant at the 1% level is ∆US6mY ield,
although the corresponding loading changes from -0.373 (Model 4) to -0.040 (Model 6). ∆V IX
even flips the sign due to multicellularity, but the corresponding loading is very small in absolute
value (-0.001) despite still being significant at the 5% level.
The adjusted R-square increases further to 44% if the endogenous, model-calibrated CDS
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systematic factors are used (Model 5). Our model-calibrated systematic factors are obtained
from the peer CDS spreads. The high explanatory power is in line with the prediction of the
theoretical model in Cespa and Foucault (2014) that shows that the price of an individual
security is affected by the peer information, in additional to its fundamental value. Our three
endogenous systematic credit risk factors (rating-based y, industry-based λIND, and market-
based λMKT ) seem to capture different aspects of the CDS spread changes. They do not
jeopardise each other’s significance and have similar effect on the changes of CDS spreads. The
corresponding coefficients of 0.348, 0.305, and 0.375 are all significant at the 1% level. The
loadings on two systematic liquidity factors (industry-based θIND and market-based θMKT )
of 0.295 and 0.484, respectively, are also significant at 1% level. This results highlight the
comparable effect of systematic liquidity and systematic credit risk factors on the dynamics of
CDS spreads.9 Moreover, in the full specification (Model 6) the adjusted R-square increases
just slightly to 46.8% compared to Model 5. Importantly, none of the endogenous systematic
factors looses significance. The estimated coefficients as well as the corresponding t-statistics
remain comparable in the full model.
Overall, the results unambiguously show the dominant role of the endogenous CDS-market
specific credit and liquidity factors in determining CDS spreads. Any analysis that relies on
individual factors only will suffer from the omitted variable bias and may provide inaccurate
results.
5.3 Sub-period Analysis
To assess the stability of our results, we repeat the analysis for two sub-samples of equal length:
before the financial crisis of 2007 (from 2002 to 2006) and during and after the crisis (from 2007
to 2011). Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between ∆ logCDS and the explanatory
variables in two sub-periods.
9Note, the coefficient of ∆ log |e| is negative of -0.069. |e| is the distance from individual CDS spread to the
rating-based CDS spread, and capture the idiosyncratic noise with respect to the model. The smaller noise is
associated with less uncertainty about the actual level of the CDS spread, which corresponds to worse quality
borrowers, and higher CDS spread changes.
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Table 5: Factors correlation: sub-sample analysis
The table reports the correlation coefficients between the ∆ logCDS spread and
other explanatory variables across two sub-samples: from 2002 to 2006, and 2007
to 2011. ∆ denotes quarterly changes. CR is firm’s cash ratio; Profit is firm’s
accounting profitability; TA is firm’s total book value of asset; DTD is Merton’s
distance to default; HVol is the historical volatility of the underlying stock; Lev is
firm’s leverage ratio; Contr is the number of contributors to CDS quotes; HL is the
highest minus lowest CDS spreads in a month; Roll is the Roll (1984) measure; Zeros
is the days of zero returns; AmihudCDS is the Amihud (2002) illiqudity measure
of the CDS spreads; AmihudStock is the Amihud (2002) illiqudity measure of the
underlying stock; Recovery is the CDS recovery rate; US6mYield is the U.S. 6-
month Treasury yield; Slope is the difference between 10-year and 6-month yields;
BaaMinusAaa is the difference between Baa and Aaa yields; VIX is the CBOE VIX
index; y and |e| are the components from Nelson-Siegel model; and θ and λ are the
components from Leland-Toft model.
2002–2006 2007–2011
∆ CR -.027 -.034
∆ Profit -.029 -.006
∆ TA .006 .000
∆ DTD -.234 -.408
∆ HVol .153 .379
∆ Lev .198 .366
∆ Contr .087 .029
∆ HL .183 .235
∆ Roll .085 .095
∆ Zeros -.047 .008
∆ logAmihudCDS -.039 .027
∆ logAmihodStock .144 .388
∆ Recovery -.068 -.047
∆ US6mYield -.049 -.451
∆ Slope .003 .030
∆ BaaMinusAaa .280 .506
∆ VIX .180 .437
∆ log y .420 .638
∆ log |e| .022 .152
∆ log θIND .059 .321
∆ log λIND .371 .453
∆ log θMKT .042 .342
∆ log λMKT .412 .470
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Majority of the correlation coefficients increases substantially in 2007–2011. Among the set of
the individual credit-risk factors, the correlation coefficient of ∆ logCDS with ∆DTD increases
in absolute value from -23.4% to -40.8%; with ∆HV ol it increases from 15.3% to 37.9%, and
with ∆Lev it increases from 19.8% to 36.6%. From the set of individual liquidity measures, the
correlation with equity illiquidity exhibits the highest change increasing from 14.4% to 38.8%.
Systematic factors become more correlated with the CDS spread during 2007–2011 period, too.
The correlation of ∆US6mY ield and ∆ logCDS change from -4.9% to -45.1%, the one with
∆BaaMinusAaa increases from 28% to 50.6%, and the one with ∆V ix increases from 18% to
43.7%. Similar increase in correlation is observed for the endogenous systemic risk factors with
∆ log y reaching the correlation coefficient of 63.8% with ∆ logCDS, indicating very strong
comovements in the CDS market after the crisis. One of the largest increases, however, are
associated with the correlation with the endogenous liquidity factors (θIND and θMKT ). They
increase from around 5% in 2002–2006 to over 30% in 2007–2011, implying a more important
role of systematic liquidity risk in determining CDS spreads in the later part of our sample.
Table 6 reports the panel regression results for the two sub-periods. Consistent with the
increase in the correlation coefficients, the adjusted R-squares in 2007–2011 are all higher than
in 2002–2006. For the complete specification (Model 6), the R-square increases from 31.4% to
50.4%.
There are also several important changes in the significance of the explanatory variables.
Among the individual credit-risk related variables, ∆ log Lev has consistent strong effect on
CDS spread in both periods, when the full model is used, whereas ∆DTD is significant only
during the first period. As for individual liquidity measures, only ∆HL has consistent positive
impact in both periods, with ∆Zeros and ∆ logAmihudStock being significant only before the
crisis. Systematic exogenous factors are also significant only during earlier sub-sample. The
strong negative relation of ∆US6mYield and positive relation of ∆BaaMinusAaa with the
changes in the CDS spread before the crisis turns insignificant in 2007–2011. The only set of
factors with strong and consistent effect on the changes in CDS spreads is the set of endogenous
systematic factors. All these factors retain their significance in both periods. The loadings on
endogenous systematic credit-risk factors (∆ log y, ∆λIND, and ∆λMKT ) increase in during the
second period, consistent with the higher interdependence between CDS spreads after the crisis.
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Importantly, the systematic CDS market liquidity factors turn substantially more important
during and after the crisis. The loadings on ∆ log θIND go up from 0.183 to 0.250, both being
significant at the 1% level. The loading on ∆ log θMKT increase from insignificant 0.120 to
highly significant 0.454.
Thus, the subperiod analysis confirms the decisive role of the systematic factors in deter-
mining changes of CDS spreads. The systematic liquidity risk used to play a relatively smaller
role during calm market conditions as compared to systematic credit risk, but its importance
has increased substantially after the financial crisis of 2007.
5.4 Out of Sample Prediction
One potential application of our model is estimation of (changes in) CDS spreads for firms that
do not have (actively) traded CDS. One can choose, for example, the last CDS quote available
or an industry/rating average CDS as the initial value as suggested by Basel III, and then apply
our model to refine the spread estimate for a particular firm.
In order to assess the quality of cross-sectional predictability of our model, we randomly
choose 100 firms as a test sample with the remaining firms being a training sample. The model
is estimated based on the training sample and the CDS changes are predicted for the test
sample. We then compute the adjusted out-of-sample R-square R
2
OOS using a simple average of
the past CDS changes as a benchmark (s̄i), following Welch and Goyal (2008). The procedure
is repeated 1,000 times.
R
2
OOS = 1−
∑
i
∑
t(sit − ŝit)2 / DFA∑
i
∑
t(sit − s̄i)2 / DFN
(12)
s̄i =
1
T
∑
t
sit (13)
where sit is the change in logCDS spread of firm i over quarter t, and T is the number of past
quarters used, ŝit is the predicted change of logCDS spread based on our model with parameters
estimated using a training sub-sample, and DF is the number of degrees of freedom for the
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Table 6: Panel regression results: sub-sample analysis
The table reports the panel regressions results for the quarterly changes in log CDS spreads
for two sub-periods 2002–2006, and 2007–2011. The explanatory variables are described
in Sections 3. D is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 after August 2010 to control for
the reporting changes of the Markit database. ***, **, and * stand for the significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
2002–2006 2007–2011
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6 Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.039*** -0.028*** -0.021 0.062*** 0.080*** -0.022*** 0.005 0.004
[-14.596] [-14.825] [-3.511] [-2.775] [-1.482] [11.098] [14.198] [-3.866] [1.055] [0.750]
∆ CR -0.030 -0.012 -0.026 0.009
[-1.298] [-0.613] [-1.088] [0.493]
∆ Profit -0.107 -0.066 -0.014 -0.002
[-1.512] [-1.076] [-0.398] [-0.087]
∆ TA -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
[-2.870] [-0.842] [-2.681] [-0.978]
∆ DTD -0.041*** -0.026*** -0.040*** 0.002
[-6.170] [-4.343] [-7.612] [0.414]
∆ log HVol 0.295*** 0.148** 0.711*** 0.176***
[3.603] [2.035] [15.583] [3.694]
∆ log Lev 0.444*** 0.259*** 0.796*** 0.294***
[7.433] [4.933] [18.307] [7.862]
∆ Contr 0.009*** 0.002 0.001 0.004*
[4.856] [1.377] [0.346] [1.917]
∆ HL 21.007*** 16.768*** 9.252*** 6.624***
[9.740] [9.040] [15.227] [13.606]
∆ Roll 10.483 8.137 -10.484*** -7.069***
[1.303] [1.183] [-4.297] [-3.687]
∆ Zeros -0.077** -0.101*** -0.072* -0.026
[-2.163] [-3.257] [-1.754] [-0.811]
∆ logAmihudCDS -6.307** -2.306 -5.210* 1.436
[-2.340] [-0.965] [-1.877] [0.654]
∆ logAmihudStock 0.253*** 0.089*** 0.587*** -0.010
[8.261] [3.155] [34.997] [-0.538]
∆ Contr × D 0.059*** 0.015**
[7.593] [2.334]
∆ HL × D 14.698*** 9.975***
[4.920] [4.208]
∆ Roll × D 1.302 -0.204
[0.135] [-0.027]
∆ Zeros × D 0.257 -0.165
[1.519] [-1.231]
∆AmihudCDS× D 15.518*** -1.865
[3.208] [-0.486]
∆ Recovery -15.480*** -7.928*** 14.423*** 0.425
[-11.320] [-6.049] [8.460] [0.250]
∆ US6mYield -0.169*** -0.099*** -0.438*** -0.004
[-6.254] [-3.787] [-33.002] [-0.245]
∆ Slope 0.044** 0.002 -0.154*** 0.010
[2.069] [0.106] [-12.941] [0.776]
∆ BaaMinusAaa 1.383*** 0.356*** 0.255*** 0.003
[20.986] [4.735] [16.995] [0.221]
∆ VIX 0.026*** 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.002***
[12.106] [3.314] [15.572] [-3.069]
∆ log y 0.391*** 0.238*** 0.296*** 0.277***
[13.137] [7.749] [11.449] [10.373]
∆ log |e| -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.078*** -0.080***
[-7.177] [-7.241] [-18.331] [-19.027]
∆ log θIND 0.248*** 0.183*** 0.307*** 0.250***
[6.212] [4.619] [7.122] [5.854]
∆ log λIND 0.246*** 0.226*** 0.345*** 0.324***
[8.960] [8.605] [13.458] [12.844]
∆ log θMKT 0.365*** 0.120 0.538*** 0.454***
[4.903] [1.565] [10.081] [7.930]
∆ log λMKT 0.339*** 0.275*** 0.408*** 0.394***
[8.866] [7.071] [11.361] [9.925]
Adj R-sqr 0.067 0.056 0.168 0.248 0.314 0.215 0.194 0.367 0.479 0.504
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null hypothesis that the proposed model (ŝ) does not perform better than that benchmark (s̄).
We consider two cases for the out-of-sample prediction. The first one mimics a situation
in which a firm of interest does have CDSs, but they are not frequently traded. Using the
past quotes, the individual CDS liquidity measures can still be computed, and the unobserved
current level of CDS spread can be forecasted based on our full model specification. The
second case presents a situation in which a firm does not have CDSs. Individual CDS liquidity
information is, thus, not available either. For this scenario, we exclude the firm-specific liquidity
factors from the model when estimating its parameters and forming forecasts. The descriptive
statistics of R
2
OOS for both scenarios are reported in Table 7. Panel A reports the results for the
case with the individual liquidity measures, Panel B reports the results excluding them. The
model that excludes individual CDS liquidity characteristics has only marginally smaller out-of-
sample R-squares, again, highlighting the determinant role of the systematic information. The
mean square error of the cross-sectional out-of-sample predictions improves on average by 43%
compared to a simple average. The out-of-sample R-square reaches 46% after 2007, and even
in the earlier sub-sample it is solid 25% when individual liquidity factors are used and almost
24% when they are excluded. Thus, our model consistently improves the quality of forecasts of
CDS spreads and can be a helpful tool to approximate CDS spreads when needed.10
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate determinants of individual firms’ CDS spreads. Using quarterly
changes of 1-year CDS spreads of 356 U.S. non-financial firms over the sample period from
2002 to 2011, we show that four types of factors affect CDS spreads: firm specific credit risk
factors, firm specific liquidity factors, exogenous systematic factors, and endogenous credit and
liquidity systematic factors. Taken together, these factors explain up to 46.7% of the variation
of changes of individual CDS spreads. Our model performs well out-of-sample, substantially
improving cross-sectional predictability, with the reduction in the mean square error by 43%
10In addition, we perform the time-series rolling-window out-of-sample analysis. We use the initial sample
period from January 2002 to January 2005, and then roll the sample forward by one month. In this setting, we
perform a general time-series out-of-sample prediction, but found a negative R
2
OOS . Hence, the model should
not be used for predicting future changes in CDS spreads, unless the reliable estimates of future values of the
systematic factors are available.
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Table 7: Out-of-sample Results
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the adjusted out-of-sample R-square
(R
2
OOS) for quarterly changes in log CDS spreads for non-financial firms. In the
cross-sectional prediction, we randomly choose 100 firms as a test sample and use
the remaining firms as a training sample. The procedure is repeated 1,000 times.
The results are reported for the complete sample period from 2002 to 2011, and
two sub-sample periods before- and after- the financial crisis of 2007. Panel A uses
the full model including individual liquidity measures. Panel B uses a reduced form
excluding individual liquidity measures.
2002–2011 2002–2006 2007–2011
Panel A: Including individual liquidity
Mean 0.434 0.251 0.464
Std 0.028 0.033 0.033
Max 0.500 0.352 0.545
Min 0.309 0.068 0.302
Panel B: Excluding individual liquidity
Mean 0.431 0.237 0.460
Std 0.022 0.033 0.026
Max 0.498 0.326 0.525
Min 0.358 0.092 0.370
compared with the sample average.
Among individual credit risk factors, a firm leverage has the strongest effect on CDS spread
which is also stable across different market conditions. Individual CDS liquidity factors are as
important as credit risk factors, with the difference between the highest and the lowers quote
for the CDS spread (a low frequency proxy for a bid-ask spread) being the strongest and robust
predictor.
Most importantly, we find that endogenous systematic factors dominate in terms of the
explanatory power individual CDS factors and suppress exogenous systematic factors, especially
after the financial crisis of 2007. We derive three endogenous systematic CDS credit factors
based on peer information: a rating-based (using a Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition)
and industry- and market-wide (using the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996)). These
factors capture different angles of systematic risk and are all significant predictors of CDS
changes. Moreover, to the best knowledge, our paper is the first to construct systematic CDS
illiquidity factors: industry- and market-wide CDS illiquiduty. We show that systematic CDS
illiquidty is as important as systematic credit risk in explaining changes in the spreads, and its
effect increases substantially after the financial crisis.
Financial regulations, such as BASEL III, stipulate that CDS spreads must be used to
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produce market estimates of the default probability of a counterparty. Our findings challenge
this approach as changes of individual firms’ CDS spreads are driven mainly by systematic
factors, including systematic liquidity risk, and not firm’s default risk. Our new systematic
CDS market illiquidity factors can be potentially used in the context of other asset pricing
models, improving the predictive power of, e.g., models for bonds and derivatives.
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Appendices
A Calibration of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) Model
Following Nelson-Siegel (1987) model, we assume the firm’s default intensity (h) at time τ can
be expressed as
h(τ) = y(τ) + e(τ) (14)
where y is the fitted value specific to the credit rating class, and e is the residual. y(τ) has the
following form, which allows for a hump-shaped term structure:
y(τ |β0, β1, β2,m) = β0 + β1
(
1− exp (−τ/m)
τ/m
)
+ β2
(
1− exp (−τ/m)
τ/m
− exp (−τ/m)
)
(15)
where β0 and β1 are the long-term and short-term hazard rates, β2 captures a hump at the
medium term, and m determines the shape and the position of the hump. We set β0 > 0,
β0 + β1 > 0, β0 + β1 + β2 > 0 and m > 0 to avoid negative values of h. y(τ) is fitted to a group
of CDSs with the same credit rating, and it is constant for all CDSs with the same maturity
and belonging to the same rating class.
We calculate CDS-implied default intensity using the Carr and Wu (2011) framework. The
authors define a unit recovery claim (URC) as a security that pays one unit if a firm defaults be-
fore time T . Under this assumption, the default intensity h can be calculated as h = C/(1−R),
where C is the CDS spread and R is the recovery rate. We use the URC-implied default inten-
sity to perform Nelson-Siegel calibration. Then, using the calibrated parameters, we compute
y and e for one-year CDS contract in each rating class for each date of interest.
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B Calibration of the Leland-Toft (1996) Model
Following Forte (2011), we assume the following form for a CDS spread, which prevents negative
spreads:
CDS =λ× θ
logCDS = log λ+ log θ (16)
where CDS is the observed CDS spread, λ is the credit spread calibrated using the Leland and
Toft (1996) model, and θ is the illiquidity (or noise) of CDS spread.
Forte (2011) provides detailed discussion of the calibration procedure of CDS spreads to the
Leland and Toft (1996) model. We modify this procedure by also using the reported recovery
rates, which allows us to obtain both λ and θ components. Our modified procedure is detailed
below.
B.1 Calibrating Individual Firm’s Credit Spread
For a firm’s value Vt, following a geometric Brownian motion, Leland and Toft (1996) show
that the value of debt with maturity τ can be expressed as
d(Vt, τ) =
c(τ)
r
+
{
e−rτ [k(τ)− c(τ)
r
][1− Ft(τ)]
}
+
{
[R(τ)VB −
c(τ)
r
]Gt(τ)
}
(17)
where c(τ) is the bond coupon payment, k(τ) is the bond principle, r is the risk-free rate,
VB is the default barrier, R(τ) is the recovery rate at default, 1 − F (τ) is the firm’s survival
probability and G(τ) is the probability of default.11
The debt value in Equation (17) consists of three terms: c(τ)/r is the present value of
coupons, the first and the second sets of curly brackets are the present values of bonds in the
case of no default and in the case of a default respectively.
11See Leland and Toft (1996) for detailed discussion.
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The total debt value of the firm is the sum of all N outstanding debts:
D(Vt) =
N∑
i=1
d(Vt, τi). (18)
In Equation (17), R(τ)VB is the residual value of a firm, or default barrier, in the case of a
default:
R(τ)VB = (1− α)βk(τ) (19)
where α is the bankruptcy cost and β is the default point expressed as a percentage of the
face value of debt, k(τ). Forte (2011) equates (1− α)β to the recovery rate. Since our Markit
database provides an estimate of a recovery rate (R), we set β = R
1−α with α = 0.3 following
Leland (2004). Hence, d(Vt, τ) can be re-expressed as
d(Vt, τ) =
c(τ)
r
+ e−rτ [k(τ)− c(τ)
r
][1− Ft(τ)] + [(1− α)βk(τ)−
c(τ)
r
]Gt(τ). (20)
Therefore, the bond yield for τ -year debt is
yield(Vt, τ) =
c(τ)
d(Vt, τ)
(21)
and the implied credit spread, λt, is
12
λt(τ) = yield(Vt, τ)− rt. (22)
B.2 Estimating a Firm’s Value From its Equity Value
Asset value Vt is needed to calculate Ft(τ) and Gt(τ) in Equation (20). As Vt is unobservable,
it has to be calibrated using observable equity prices. We use the firm’s capital structure to
12Forte (2011) uses individual firm CDS to calibrate the β value in Equation (19) for each firm, and shows
that the calibrated λt is indeed very close to the market observed CDS spread, and has the same trend. We
fixed the value of β by using the Markit recovery rate, and provide a CDS independent credit spread calibration.
The fixing of β value turns out not to be decisive for our results, as the choice of α and β only affect the level,
but not the time series variations, of calibrated credit spreads. In all our empirical tests, only changes in these
factors are used.
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obtain the implied asset value. We denote the equity value by S(Vt), and the firm’s capital
structure satisfies
Vt = S(Vt) +D(Vt) +BC(Vt)
S(Vt) = Vt −D(Vt)−BC(Vt) (23)
where, according to Forte (2011), BC(Vt) = D(Vt|α = 0) − D(Vt) is the bankruptcy cost.
Therefore, by setting α = 0, Equation (23) becomes
S(Vt) = Vt −D(Vt|α = 0) (24)
We first calibrate Vt to the observed stock price St using Equation (24) and an iterative
process, and then use the calibrated Vt to calculate Ft(τ), Gt(τ) and yield(Vt, τ).
We calibrate the individual firm’s credit spread on a daily basis, and then compute individual
daily residuals from Equation (16): logCDSit − log λit. To instill stability into the noisy daily
estimate of the illiquidity component, we then calculated θit as the average of the daily residuals
over the last 12 months.
C Analysis of Endogenous Systematic Factors
In this appendix, we analyse in detail the information content of the our endogenous systematic
credit and liquidity factors.
Figure 1 plots the log systematic market-wide credit risk component (log λMKTt ) in which all
industries are used and the log market CDS spread, which is the average of the individual CDS
spreads (logCDSMKTt ). Subplot (a) shows that although log λ
MKT
t is almost always above
logCDSMKTt , they exhibit common trends. The times of peaks and troughs are similar for
both series, despite them being derived from prices of instruments traded in different markets
(CDS market for CDS spreads and stock market for systematic credit risk component). The
scatter plot in subplot (b) clearly demonstrates a linear dependence between the two variables,
indicating that the systematic credit risk factor captures well the average dynamics of CDS
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spreads.
Figure 2 plots the time series of the CDS market insipidity factor θMKTt . Until 2008, θ
MKT
t
is very small and continues to decline over time. It peaks in the immediate post-crisis era, and
declines from mid 2009 to just about the pre-crisis level as of the end of 2011.
To make sure that our CDS market illiquidity factor, θMKTt , does indeed contain liquidity-
related information, and not pure noise, we run a regression of log θMKTt on various well
known liquidity determinants. Following Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2011), we in-
clude the CBOE VIX index (V IX), the average of individual firms’ 30-day historical stock
volatility (30DHistV ol), the average of individual stocks’ log Amihud illiquidity measures
(logAmihudStock), and the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa yields (BaaMinusAaa)
to capture ‘overall’ market illiquidity (Hu, Pan, and Wang 2013). We also include the average
pairwise correlation of stock returns for all firms in our sample (StockPairCorr) to proxy for
equity correlation risk, which usually increases on illiquid markets.
Figure 3 shows that our CDS market illiquidity factor (∆ log θMKTt ) and the five illiquidity
determinants have similar time-series dynamics: all of them responded strongly to the subprime
crisis 2007–2009. Figure 4 further shows the scatter plots of individual liquidity determinants
against our CDS market illiquidity factor. The clearest linear association is between ∆ log θMKTt
and the cross-sectional average Amihud stock illiquidity measure. Interestingly, there is a non-
linear relation between ∆ log θMKTt and the other four liquidity determinants. The positive
association holds only for positive values of ∆ log θMKTt , when CDS market turns more illiquid.
The results of the formal analysis of our systematic CDS illiqudity factor are reported in
Table 8. Consistent with the previous analysis, Panel A reports positive correlation coeffcients
between ∆ log θMKTt and the five illiquidity determinants. The highest correlation coefficient
is that with ∆ logAmihudStock (0.52), followed by ∆30DHistV ol (0.36) and ∆BaaMinusAaa
(0.34). The correlation with VIX (0.23) and ∆StockPairCorr (0.18) are much smaller.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the estimation results for the following regression of quarterly
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Figure 1: Systematic Market-Wide Credit Component (λ) vs. Average CDS Spread (CDS)
Sub-figure (i) plots the time series of the average log CDS spreads and log of our
market-wide credit component (λ). Sub-figure (ii) contains a scatter plot of the
quarterly changes in these variables.
(i) Time-series plot of logCDSMKTt and log λ
MKT
t
(ii) Changes in log λMKTt vs. logCDS
MKT
t
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Figure 2: CDS Market Illiquidity Factor (θMKTt )
The figure plots the time series of our systematic CDS market illiqudiuty measure
θMKT from January 2002 to May 2011.
changes in the systematic CDS illiquidity:
∆ log θMKTt = β0 + β1∆ logAmihudStockt + β2∆V IXt + β3∆BaaMinusAaa
+β4∆30DHistV olt + β5∆StockPairCorrt + εt (25)
where logAmihudStockt is the average of individual stock log Amihud measures, V IXt is the
CBOE VIX spot index, BaaMinusAaat is the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa
yields, 30DHistV olt is the average of individual firms’ 30-day historical stock volatility, and
StockPairCorrt is the average of pairwise correlation of stock returns for all firms in our sample.
In Panel B Column (1), only the loading on the stock Amihud measure is significant at the
1% level with the adjusted R-square being 25%. The result does not alter when an additional
dummy variable for the post-crisis period is included (Column 2). The loading on the dummy
variable is positive and significant, supporting potential structural break after the financial
crisis, but the Amihud measure remains significant at the 1% level. Thus, on average, our
systematic CDS illiquidity measure is significantly positively related to stock market illiquidity,
but it still contains substantial information, orthogonal to the stock illiquidity only.
The scatter plots in Figure 4 suggest a non-linear association between our systematic CDS
illiquidity measure and other factors. We repeat the regression in Equation (25) separately
for positive and negative changes in log θMKT . Panel C reports the regression results. When
only the positive changes in log θMKT are included, all the liquidity determinants, except for
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Table 8: CDS Market Illiquidity Factor
Panel A of the table reports the correlation coefficients between of our CDS market
illiquidity factor ∆ log θMKT and other illiquidity determinant, and Panels B and
C report the corresponding regression results for the the quarterly changes from
2002 to 2011. In Panel C the regressions are estimated separately for positive and
negative changes in systematic CDS illiquidity measure. logAmihudStock is the
average log Amihud illiquidity measure of all stocks in our sample; V IX is VIX
index; BaaMinusAaa is the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Moody’s
Aaa bond yields; 30DHistV ol is 30-day historical stock volatility; StockPairCorr
is the pairwise stock correlation over the 12-month horizon; D2007−2011 is dummy
variable taking a value of 1 between 2007 and 2011. In Panlel C, the sign of negative
∆ log θMKT is flipped to ease the interpretation of the results.
Panel A: Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) ∆ log θMKT
(2) ∆ logAmihudStock 0.52
(3) ∆V IX 0.23 0.40
(4) ∆BaaMinusAaa 0.34 0.64 0.61
(5) ∆30DHistV ol 0.36 0.62 0.67 0.87
(6) ∆StockPairCorr 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.34 0.29
(1) (2)
Panel B: Regression Result Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
Const -0.02 -1.21 0.23 -0.07 -3.30 0.00
∆ logAmihud 0.50 4.68 0.00 0.49 4.76 0.00
∆V IX 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.00 -0.16 0.87
∆BaaMinusAaa -0.06 -0.64 0.52 -0.06 -0.68 0.50
∆30DHistV ol 0.15 0.64 0.52 0.17 0.74 0.46
∆StockPairCorr 0.18 1.25 0.22 0.16 1.18 0.24
D2007−2011 0.11 3.37 0.00
R-square 0.28 0.35
R-adjust 0.25 0.31
∆ log θMKT ≥ 0 ∆ log θMTK < 0
Panel C: Asymmetric Effect Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
Const. 0.27 10.72 0.00 0.12 11.34 0.00
∆ logAmihud -0.42 -3.09 0.00 -0.13 -1.59 0.12
∆V IX 0.00 1.88 0.07 -0.00 -0.31 0.76
∆BaaMinusAaa 0.18 2.26 0.03 0.09 0.92 0.36
∆30DHistV ol -0.11 -0.64 0.53 -0.15 -0.66 0.51
∆StockPairCorr 0.68 3.16 0.00 0.11 1.22 0.23
R-square 0.61 0.09
R-adjust 0.54 0.03
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Table 9: Regression based on the first principal component of five illiquidity determinants
This table reports the results for the regression of our CDS market liquidity factor,
∆ log θMKT , against the first principal component of the five liquidity determinants
(viz. logAmihud, V IX, BaaMinusAaa, 30DHistV ol, and StockPairCorr) over
the period from 2002 to 2011. “Explain” reports the share of variation in the
liquidity determinants explained by the first principal component. In the analysis of
asymmetric impact, we flip the sign of negative ∆ log θMKT to ease the interpretation
of the results.
All Sample ∆ log θMKT ≥ 0 ∆ log θMKT < 0
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
Const. -0.03 -1.55 0.12 0.23 9.67 0.00 0.13 14.17 0.00
1st PC 0.05 5.06 0.00 0.05 4.24 0.00 0.01 1.90 0.06
R-square 0.18 0.36 0.04
R-adjust 0.18 0.34 0.03
Explain 0.61 0.73 0.54
30DHistV ol, become significant at least at the 10% level, and the adjusted R-square improves
substantially to 54%. This indicates that CDS market illiquidity is more closely related to the
liquidity determinants when the CDS market becomes more illiquid. On the contrary, we do
not find any statistically significant relations for negative changes in log θMKTt . This finding
provides evidence of the asymmetric association between CDS market illiquidity and other
liquidity determinants. As the liquidity determinants are derived from both bond and equity
markets, our finding here suggests a possible liquidity contagion among bond, equity and CDS
markets in times of liquidity dry out.
The loading on the stock Amihud measure in Panel C of Table 8 flips the sign, which is likely
to be driven by multicollinearity with other regressors. We use the PCA decomposition of all
the liquidity determinants and re-run the regression by using only the first principal component
(PC). This first PC captures between 54% and 73% of the variation of the individual factors.
The regression results reported in Table 9 confirm an asymmetric effect of the first liquidity
factors’ PC on the CDS market illiquidity. Consistent with our previous results, the adjusted
R-square is 34% when the CDS market becomes more illiquid, whereas it is only 3% when the
CDS market becomes more liquid. Overall, there is a positive association between our CDS
market illiquidity factor and the first PC of the set of liquidity determinants, confirming that
our systematic CDS market illiquidity measure indeed captures illiquidity risk.
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Figure 3: Time Series Plots of Liquidity Determinants
The figure shows the time series plots of our systematic CDS market illiquidity factor
(log θMKT ), and five other illiquidity determinants, over the period from 2002 to
2011. ∆ represents quarterly changes. logAmihudStock is the average of individual
stock log Amihud measures, V IX is the CBOE VIX spot index, BaaMinusAaa
is the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa yields, 30DHistV ol is the
average of individual firms’ 30-day historical stock volatility, and StockPairCorr is
the average of pairwise correlation of stock returns for all firms in our sample.
(i) ∆ log θMKT (ii) ∆ logAmihudStock
(iii) ∆V IX (iv) ∆BaaNinusAaa
(v) ∆30DHistV ol (vi) ∆StockPairCorr
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Figure 4: Scatter Plots of Liquidity Determinants
The figure shows the scatter plots of five illiquidity determinants against ∆ log θMKT ,
the quarterly changes of our CDS market illiquidity factor. The sample period is
from 2002 to 2011. logAmihudStock is the average of individual stock log Ami-
hud measures, V IX is the CBOE VIX spot index, BaaMinusAaa is the difference
between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa yields, 30DHistV ol is the average of individ-
ual firms’ 30-day historical stock volatility, and StockPairCorr is the average of
pairwise correlation on stock returns for all firms in our sample.
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